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Joan Huber, Irving Louis Horowitz, and the Ideological Future 
of Objectivity in American Sociology 
Michael R. Hill 
Iowa Western Community College 
The occasion of this essay is an unsolicited but welcome invitation to 
comment on Irving Louis Horowitz's (1993) most recent book, The Decomposi-
tion o/Sociology, a work that is generating considerable discussion (e.g., Bauer-
Mengelberg 1995; Chriss 1994; Goldman 1994; Horowitz 1994, 1995; Pizzorno 
1994; Wagner 1994). An invitation to discuss a book by Horowitz in a public 
forum-to which he is invited to respond-is a genuine honor eagerly accepted 
here with what is undoubtedly a too small twinge of apprehension, a twinge of the 
minimally regarded kind that allows proverbial fools to rush into intellectual tight 
spots from which only angels, sympathetic cronies, and humble mea culpas can 
extricate them. Professor Horowitz's debating skills are considerable and 
legendary; they are challenged only at one's peril. I vividly recall, for example, 
a peripheral critique that sociologist Harold Leonard Orbach, then and now an 
associate professor of sociology at Kansas State University, once launched at 
Horowitz's (1983) authoritative intellectual biography of C. Wright Mills. 
The setting for Orbach's comeuppance was an "author meets the critics" 
session at the meetings of the Midwest Sociological Society shortly after the 
publication of Horowitz's C. Wright Mills: An American Utopian. In response to 
Orbach's nitpicking provocations, Horowitz first whittled his tormenter down to 
size, reminding us publicly that when Orbach and Horowitz were students 
enrolled together in a sociological theory course, Horowitz earned an "A" 
whereas Orbach received a substantially lower mark. Simultaneously undermin-
ing Orbach's sociological aptitude and unearthing the specter of old student 
jealousies as motivation for Orbach's criticisms, Horowitz eventually decapi-
tated Orbach's tangential commentary and concluded in a deliberate, thunderous, 
unanswerable crescendo: "If you want to know about Mills's ideas and intellec-
tual development, read my book. If you wantto know about a person's private life, 
then read People Magazine!" 
When he hits his stride, Professor Horowitz is an undisputed master of the 
crushing, well-deserved mot juste. Thus, it is the opportunity to engage Professor 
Horowitz here at typographical arm's length-in distant print rather than face-to-
face on the after-dinner dias-that gives me sufficient temerity to offer the 
following observations, run for cover, and hope for his dispensation and under-
standing. My comments are intended, after all, not as combative confrontation, 
but as convivial conversation (Deegan 1989). 
Do I too detect the rampant destruction of sociology that Irving Louis 
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Horowitz (1993) senses in The Decomposition of Sociology and to which he 
suggests I contributed (Hill 1984) by insisting on the important but largely 
unrecognized role ideology plays in framing sociological research and depart-
mental politics? The politics of political correctness can, at times, get out of hand, 
but unreflexive reliance on rationality and received canons can also be problem-
atic. Integral to Horowitz's resounding condemnation of subjectivity in Decom-
position is his unexamined, a priori faith in "objectivity." This faith is fundamen-
tally ideological rather than rational, and his ideological agenda remains hidden 
and unexplicated. To encourage Professor Horowitz to reflect on his unstated 
ideological assumptions, I draw attention to Joan Huber's (1995) recent crack-
the-whip discourse on the presumed plight of American sociology.! 
Huber and Horowitz both appeal to rational dialogue, academic civility, and 
objectivity, but with radically different results. Horowitz (1993:249) observes 
that "the risks of eclecticism ... are far less risky in human terms than demands for 
theoretical perfections built on dogmatic assumptions," and concludes: 
The challenge of the twenty-first century is to narrow the gap between 
technical progress and moral stagnation. We can best meet this challenge 
in the social sciences by permitting in the fresh breezes of other times and 
places, by reading the past's religious literature, its poetry, and its novels 
and by learning about its heroes, its architecture, sports, foods, occupa-
tions, and technology (p. 251). 
Huber, on the other hand, clamps shut "the fresh breezes," eschews the humani-
ties, and unabashedly pimps her students as statistically-trained suppliers of "the 
knowledge needed to run welfare states." Huber reaches her conclusions by 
presumably objective, rational dialogue, or so she says. How is this possible? By 
shamelessly subverting the consensual meaning of "objectivity" for her own 
patently ideological ends, ends that cannot be attacked if "objectivity" remains 
above the fray, unsullied by ideological critique. Horowitz (1993:244) under-
stands that "the struggle within each scientific discipline is ... an ideological 
forum," but does not see that his deep, unreflexive attachment to "objectivity" 
makes him a useful tool in the ideological campaigns led by Huber and her tribe. 
Huber's "report" is discussed here for three reasons: (1) She encourages top-
down, bottom-line, anti-intellectual thinking and her essay will undoubtedly be 
used instrumentally to rationalize and legitimate hiring, tenure, curriculum, 
budget, and related decisions made by managerially-minded administrators in the 
academy, (2) Horowitz's nostalgic and surprisingly unreflexive embrace of 
"objectivity" as a redemptive salve for what he perceives to be a rapidly 
decomposing sociology unwittingly lends support to those, like Huber, who trade 
fast and loose with "objectivity" as an ideological pawn in high stakes academic 
politics, and (3) Huber's (1995:204) Machiavellian masquerade as a "disinter-
ested observer seeking objective truth" serves to underscore the on-going 
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urgency of my own call, a call damned by Horowitz, to place greater emphasis on 
ideological realities in sociology. Huber's ideological subversion of "objectiv-
ity" provides a painful example of a problematic too easily dismissed by many 
sociologists of Horowitz's generation: the messy reality that "objectivity" is 
considerably more slippery and ideologically volatile than they presume it to be. 
"Objectivity" is a taken-for-granted catchword in academic discussions; it 
appeals easily to our sense of fair play and evenhandedness-and in that sense it 
is a sentiment to which I subscribe. Huber, however, gives "objectivity" an 
impudently scientistic spin. To whose slant on objectivity shall we subscribe? For 
myself, Anthony Giddens (1987:11-13) provides a helpful and sobering guide: 
To speak of sociology, and of other subjects like anthropology or econom-
ics, as "social sciences," is to stress that they involve the systematic study 
of an empirical subject-matter. The terminology is not confusing so long 
as we see that sociology and other social sciences differ from the natural 
sciences in two essential respects. 
(1) We cannot approach society, or "social facts," as we do objects or 
events in the natural world, because societies only exist in so far as they are 
created and recreated in our own actions as human beings .... 
(2) It follows from this that the practical implications of sociology are not 
directly parallel to the technological uses of science, and cannot be ... .It is 
often precisely by showing that what may appear to those involved as 
inevitable, as unchallengeable-as resembling a law of nature-is, in fact, 
an historical product, that sociological analysis can play an emancipatory 
role in human society. 
Some find Giddens less instructive, however. Huber once dismissed out of hand 
a colloquium question I posed concerning the import of Giddens's ideas with the 
condescending reply: "I'm sure Giddens'S is a bright young man, but .... " For 
Huber, science, rationality, statistical analysis, and objectivity are cut all from the 
same cloth, tailored together in standard issue sociological straight jackets that all 
of us should meekly don as Huber leads us, blinkers firmly in place, into the 
messy, unpredictable world of shark-infested social realities. 
Huber (1995:202) complains that current sociological research is too easily 
trlvialized by administrators and is too often distorted by journalists "who want 
the kind of human interest stories that make deans and department chairs wince." 
Rather than welcome and cultivate genuine public interest in (and subsequent 
financial support of) the types of reflexive information that ordinary citizens (not 
to mention undergraduate students) actually find intriguing and useful, Huber's 
craven council warns against all inquiry that might draw public criticism or 
misinterpretation by conservative board members. Huber advises that ever more 
230 
scientistic research serves us well as a profession and protects us from wolfish 
deans on the prowl for sacrificial fiscal lambs. 
Huber, herself a former dean, further cautions that to make life easier for 
university administrators (and thereby reap rewards and benefits, quid pro quo), 
sociology departments ought to shun those who profess "reformist" social 
agendas and must find antidotes for what Huber perceives as a miasma of 
antirationalism drifting into sociology from the humanities. She endorses the 
draconian, self-serving recommendations for departmental (and, therefore, dis-
ciplinary) reorganization championed by her chums in the elite world of ASA 
politics.2 Huber believes itis rational to force the historically multifaceted corpus 
of sociology onto her Procrustean administrator's bed, lop off its essential 
extremities, behead its critical faculties, scoop out its vital organs, and proudly 
strap the resulting Frankenstein forever to a life-supporting federal grant ma-
chine. She recoils in horror at the apparently awful prospect of explaining-let 
alone defending-the reflexive inquiries that give sociology historical continu-
ity, intellectual meaning and pragmatic social usefulness. To preserve bureau-
cratic perquisites and placate anti-intellectual administrators, Huber cashes in our 
sociological birthrights and tendentiously distorts the roots, visions, and accom-
plishments of American sociology.3 
Huber apparently cannot see the elitist, irrational and scientistic ideology of 
the inherently political proposals she advances. While gladly using the presti-
gious pages of the American Journal of Sociology to advance a reform scheme 
cooked-up by an ASA task group that she appointed, Huber (1995:205) 
unreflexively decries what she calls a relativistic view of science in which 
"scientific truth depends on the power of the negotiator more than on a complex 
relationship to an external reality that the negotiators cannot control." Unfazed by 
the hypocritical incongruity of her arguments, ignoring her own role as an 
institutionally powerful negotiator, Huber and the privileged club for which she 
speaks sit at the apex of disciplinary power, deftly purveying exclusionary 
venom; negotiating definitions of the discipline with government-sponsored 
agencies; nominating each other for editorships, administrative positions and 
distinguished achievement awards; and serving ever so tirelessly on the selection 
panels that fund each other's grant proposals. 
Huber is a demagogue, not a democrat. Sociology, if Huber has her way, will 
become increasingly uncoupled from the lifeworld of real people, real students, 
and real sociology, a process described by Jurgen Habermas (1989: 183) in which: 
The transfer of action coordination from language over to steering media 
means an uncoupling of interaction from lifeworld contexts. Media such 
as money and power attach to empirical ties; they encode a purposive-
rational attitude toward calculable amounts of value and make it possible 
to exert generalized, strategic influence on the decisions of other partici-
pants while bypassing processes of consensus-oriented communication. 
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Inasmuch as they do not merely simplify linguistic communication, but 
replace it with a symbolic generalization of rewards and punishments, the 
lifeworld contexts in which processes of reaching understanding are 
always embedded are devalued in favor of media-steered interactions; the 
lifeworld is no longer needed for the coordination of action. 
Similarly, Huber devalues language, robbing "objectivity," "science," and "ratio-
nality" of any reflexive, broadly consensual meaning. She purposefully marshals 
state interests, research funding and university administrative power in a perverse 
managerial calculus, willfully snuffing out the historical, cross-cultural, and 
critical embers of what once was, I think, an active sociological imagination. 
Huber and her well-funded, structurally well-positioned buddies are orchestrat-
ing a grand power grab in which all future sociological truths will be the direct 
outcome of solely their particular social values, their theoretical perspectives, 
their research methodologies, and their political ideologies. 
It is time to hold Huber and her like accountable for their pernicious, intolerant 
and increasingly shrill brand of antirationalist demagoguery. The ease with which 
sociological research today is trivialized results directly from the scientistic 
hypotheses and scientifically meaningless data collection and analysis tech-
niques championed by Huber and taught in so-called "mainstream" methods 
courses across the United States,4 not from the humanizing ideas, invigorating 
philosophical insights, and liberating political scenarios that still manage-
against the stifling prejudice of Huberesque colleagues-to find voice in far more 
than a few sociology classrooms, professional meetings, and intellectually 
rigorous monographs. It becomes more difficult, however, to challenge the 
essence of Huber's self-serving arrogance when a commentator of Professor 
Horowitz's stature unwittingly removes "objectivity," deus ex machina, from the 
contentious caldron of ideological scrutiny and debate. 
Is sociology today a deeply troubled discipline in which "objectivity" has 
become irrelevant? Has "objectivity" been swamped and drowned in a tidal wave 
of irrational identity politics and postmodern drift? Perhaps, on occasion, but this 
is not the only threat to objectivity, the challenges come equally or more so from 
mundane mammon and the empty mimicry of science. My take on this unavoid-
ably ideological question is experiential as well as analytical.5 
I came to doctoral studies in sociology after completing in 1982 a Ph.D. in 
geography at Nebraska where I became well-grounded in contemporary spatial 
theory, was outfitted with a useful armory of data collection techniques in the 
physical and social sciences, and learned firsthand the strengths and foibles of 
statistical analyses and mathematical modelling. Indeed, I find there are a few, 
albeit limited, situations in which these techniques are legitimate. This training 
led to a visiting geography position at Iowa State University that garnered in turn 
an assistant deanship for research, some interesting grants, and subsequent 
appointments in the departments of landscape architecture and community and 
regional planning, respectively. I found a happy interdisciplinary niche in 
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environmental design research. For personal reasons, however, I left Iowa and 
returned to Nebraska where I eventually took up full-time doctoral studies in 
sociology, completing the degree in 1989. Suffice it to say, life as a Nebraska 
sociology graduate student was enormously disappointing by comparison to my 
previous work, but by pursuing a second doctorate in a new field I did purchase 
a relatively unique foothold from which to assess the status of a discipline that 
Horowitz warns is disintegrating under its own factionalism and stubborn 
wrongheadedness. Is sociology a deeply troubled discipline? Yes, unquestion-
ably, and perhaps for more reasons than Horowitz fully realizes. 
An early, comparative clue to the disciplinary perverseness rife among 
sociologists came during a series of job interviews where I was interrogated, first 
by geographers, and then by sociologists. The geographers' questions always 
included a variation on the theme: "How do your recent sociological studies 
inform your current geographical interests?" The question invited an interdisci-
plinary response, one that geographers-to their credit-were prepared to 
entertain. When I interviewed for sociology jobs, however, the inquisitors 
invariably asked, "Why did you leave geography?" The underlying assumption, 
as I have come to understand all too well, is that American sociologists as a group 
(and especially those who become administrators) are hopelessly insular. It was 
apparently unthinkable for these interviewers to conceive that someone could 
practice sociology without abandoning all ties to any other discipline or prior 
intellectual life. 
Presumably this sort of addled logic prevents sociologists like Huber from 
ever entertaining the idea that the likes of Harriet Martineau, Jane Addams, 
Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Roscoe Pound, George Herbert Mead, etc., were ever 
really sociologists. They were, after all, aligned at one time or another with 
diverse intellectual disciplines, were they not? Huber's brand of historical 
revisionism willfully excises uncomfortable contributors to our sociological 
heritage in the same way that systematic empiricists stupidly ignore the reality 
that time and time again the amount of statistical variance they leave unexplained 
is monstrously greater than that which they smugly present as objectively 
discovered "fact." Huber mulishly flames the fires of exclusionary debates over 
who is (and who is not) a sociologist (Deegan 1987), creating an unwelcome 
climate that wastefully stifles the relevance, sagacity, and tempering effect of 
widespread interdisciplinary exchange with neighboring disciplinarians, includ-
ing those in the humanities. Make no mistake, Huber is hosting a puritanical witch 
hunt and those of us who disagree with her will soon feel the flaming faggots 
'round our feet-if she has her way. 
Professor Horowitz, by contrast, is a maverick sociologist, a prototypical 
interdisciplinary scholar of which the multifaceted books and journals issued by 
Transaction Publications are elegant and substantive testimony. He reads books, 
thinks about ideas, and writes provocatively. He does not engage in mindless 
scientism. When he tells us what sociology ought to be, and thus by implication 
who the real sociologists really are, he clearly knows better than many who call 
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themselves sociologists. Perhaps we ought to listen. 
The difficulty of getting anyone to listen to Professor Horowitz is, however, 
no small matter. He comments at length on writers most of whom many 
contemporary sociology students and many of their mentors have never studied. 
Intellectual rigor is wanting in American sociology today, but not for lack of 
required statistical training as Huber inexplicably concludes. I meet too many 
highly touted graduate students who willingly spend endless hours at CRTs but 
who read, at best, only excerpts or cursory synopses of Durkheim, Marx, Weber 
and the like ("If it' s not in ASR, why bother?,,).6 This is not a crowd to whom the 
names Adorno, Edel, Feuer, or, for that matter, Horowitz, have any resonance 
("Are these guys sociologists, how come I never heard of 'em?"). With few 
exceptions, today's students do not read the works of Small, Ross, Park, Burgess, 
Homans, Merton, Myrdal, Nisbet, Parsons, Thomas, Berger, Lipset, Lippmann, 
or Lynd,just to round up some ofthe better-known patriarchs that sociologists of 
Horowitz's generation and training take for granted. Nor do they read deeply, if 
at all, from the major treatises of more recent theorists. The general lack of 
scholarly preparation and intellectual curiosity is shocking, regardless of whose 
canon one champions or critiques, and it's a problem that an erudite book like The 
Decomposition of Sociology misses altogether. It's a problem that Horowitz 
cannot practically conceive, or he would not have written the book he did. He 
might as well write in foreign tongues, like Spanish, French or German, as these 
too are no longer required for a sociology doctorate at Nebraska and many other 
programs. 
Horowitz's arguments are irrelevant to the hard core and befuddled fringe of 
scientistic sociologists in the midwest, at least. A few of the larger quantitative 
programs tolerate transient outcroppings of "alternative" sociologies, but the 
chief work, the mainline activity that gets good pay, tenure-track jobs, and the 
back-slapping congratulations of deans and institutional development officers is 
nothing less than the well-funded number crunching that Huber champions. The 
smaller programs, like Nebraska, simply ape their bigger counterparts, jumping 
blindly on the same scientistic bandwagons. It can be tragic to be an unwary 
student or a naive new faculty member in this vortex of money, status, and greed. 
Ther~ is little room for ideas, unless they can be reduced to an equation or milked 
for a grant. There is certainly little understanding of or sympathy for the high level 
of erudite discussion that characterizes Decomposition. After all, Horowitz does 
not tell us how to select our samples, estimate missing data, or tweak our models. 
What Horowitz does do, however, and this will not go unnoticed or 
unmanipulated by Huber and her crowd, is to provide unstinting support for 
"objectivity" as a litmus test for sociological legitimacy. Whereas Horowitz 
(1993: 108) skillfully guts the innards of the late James Coleman's model of 
economic rationality ("Coleman does not...take us beyond a rather desultory set 
of ad hoc observations"), Horowitz (1993: 104) nonetheless praises Coleman for 
his objectivity and humanity ("Indeed, one of the charms of Coleman is that he 
holds fIrm to this Enlightenment canon of objectivity and its rewards"). Just how 
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objective is a man, however, who from the top echelons of his profession joins in 
Huber's recommendations and, with managerial obsessiveness, laments to the 
effect that, "The basic flaw in academic organization is the failure to exact control 
of faculty time in exchange for salary" (Huber 1995: 199)? Is it objective to use 
the lifeless ad hoc logics of econometrics to infer "flaws" in an organizational 
form wherein Coleman personally enjoyed a privileged, powerful position and 
would have been largely exempt from the increasingly onerous top-down, 
bureaucratic controls he recommended? In a word, no. Coleman embodied the 
height of academic arrogance and the pernicious inversion of objectivity. 
The "imperial pretensions" that Horowitz (1993: 117) rightly discerns among 
rational choice and other prestige-hungry cliques in the American Sociological 
Association have at least as much to do with the elitist arrogance of academic 
power as they do with inherently intellectual or epistemological arguments per se. 
Horowitz is a master of scholarly debate, but it is less evident that he attends as 
carefully or reflexively to the structural mechanisms of academic power that 
create "distinguished" scholars, "important individuals," "canons," and the like. 
Horowitz (1993:245, 247) maintains that there can be no "culture of civility" in 
sociology "without a dialogue among the classics of the social sciences," and that, 
centrally, "[ w ]hat remains, the underlying grit of social science as social practice, 
is the collective response to the struggle between important individuals who have 
gripped the minds and hearts of people from generation to generation." Here is 
Horowitz's own imperial pretension, for he, like Huber, sees neither himself nor 
his sociological friends as privileged, instrumental brokers ofthe very sociologi-
cal canon they revere. The classics, the received canon, become for Horowitz an 
objective reality arising from a collective and presumptively democratic dia-
logue. We can admire Horowitz's romantic passion, but the "important individu-
als" he admires became important in large part due to historical accident, 
university politics, patriarchal and racist prejudices, and so on. This is not to say 
that those who become identified as "important" do not work hard or do not 
sometimes write provocative treatises, of course they do. 
I take the view that most of us who pursue the scholarly life are equipped with 
pretty much the same intellectual abilities. The extent, however, to which these 
capabilities become disciplined, energized, and find a showcase is often a matter 
ofluck, prejudice, sponsorship, and aggressive flattery. By contrast, says Horowitz 
(1993:249), "We must turn away from the idea that others adjudicate our 
conditions oflife. We must want to adjudicate our own lives." That dichotomy is 
phony. We are, as Horowitz obviously knows, responsible agents acting in a 
society of institutionalized possibilities and coercions. Where we see and cel-
ebrate the opportunities for pulling ourselves up by our bootstraps, we must be 
simultaneously cognizant of the obstacles, limitations, and power structures that 
shape the real world of academia. In my experience, most people in the academy 
who become "important" become so largely due to position, pull, and perqui-
sites-rarely from any arguably greater intellect, insight, or individual virtue. 
The top people are not inherently more important than anybody else, we 
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simply have a society replete with hierarchical structures in which those who 
occupy the uppermost rungs in academia get more time and resources to create, 
publicize, and promote their work. Understanding that occupancy ofthe top spots 
results pretty much from sycophancy and the throw of structurally-loaded, often 
misogynist, racist dice is not news. I am confident that there are literally thousands 
of folks just as talented as James Coleman, Stanley Lieberson, Seymour Martin 
Lipset and the other luminaries that Horowitz admires who, if plopped down in 
elite schools and furnished with frequent sabbaticals, organizational support, 
endowed chairs, and the lUxury of teaching largely at their own discretion, could 
produce work that would be at least equal to-and frequently surpass-the 
treatises regularly trotted out by the past and current casts of "important" 
sociologists. 
The "important" sociologists create their own mythology, slap each other on 
the back, and promulgate the professional ideology that only those who merit 
election are selected into their rarified ranks'? The right to hand-pick one's 
successors (and that is literally what tenure committees do) is a powerful tool in 
the reproduction of professional privilege and prestige. The "important" sociolo-
gists at each level of the hierarchy elect only those who bow or pledge obedience 
to this "importance," ad infinitum. It is naive, given such a system, to suggest that 
the canon endorsed by the tenured cabal is a "collective response to the struggle 
between important individuals who have gripped the minds and hearts of people 
from generation to generation" (Horowitz 1993:247). This is neither an open nor 
democratic process, but a brutish bureaucratic nightmare in which people are 
gripped by the throat and threatened with job loss. Students are not free to read 
widely, they are assigned, coerced to read, if they read, from a canon approved 
by their professors, professors who have multiple vested interests in propping up 
the canon in which they are expert, which cites the literatures their mentors 
assigned, and so on. For example, would anyone give much notice to Robert 
Merton's rather middling ideas if he were ensconced in a four-year, church-
related college somewhere in southern Indiana teaching endless sections of intro 
classes rather than well positioned as a powerful professor at a prestigious 
university? I do not think so. 
Ideological issues are now shaping academic discourse such that "objectiv-
ity," "rationality," and collegial "civility" are little more than codewords for 
canonical correctness. This is not-how Horowitz intends these terms, but he helps 
set the stage on which Huber and her cronies can more easily appropriate these 
and related concepts for their own autonomous uses. Horowitz does not ignore 
ideological problems. Indeed, Decomposition is a welcome and vigorous foray 
into many ideological issues in sociology, but it is one sided; he holds up a one-
way mirror to the discipline. Horowitz would be more instructive if he also 
examined the origins and developments of his own necessarily ideological 
positions. 
Of my initial call for up-front, in-your -face ideological self-reflection, Horowitz 
(1993:47) writes in Decomposition: 
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A clear expression of this sort of analysis based on subjectivist premises, 
and its potential for political destruction, comes from a 1984 article in the 
Mid-American Review of Sociology by Michael R. Hill, who concludes by 
bemoaning the absence of works on ideology-not to expose shabby 
thinking as a road to ruin, but rather the absolute reverse: the need for 
ideology as "legitimate sociological thought." He concludes by saying, "It 
is time to turn the tide: ideology first, axiology second, epistemology 
third." It is a sad truth that the tide has indeed been turned, with outbursts 
of ideological thinking and subjectivist orientations bordering on solip-
sism being viewed as nothing less than the touchstones of an authentic 
social science. 
Would that I could wield such influence, but, alas, I do not. I first read this tangled 
interpretation of my work in a 1989 issue of Transaction (Horowitz 1989) and at 
that time corresponded with Professor Horowitz concerning the main points. We 
had a pleasant and civil exchange. It is a surprise, therefore, to see myself critiqued 
in 1993 in the exact same words he used in 1989. This may be the start of a 
Sisyphean journey, but I must try again, for the points I made twelve years ago 
are still, I think, essentially valid. My central assertion then and now is a point that 
Irving Louis Horowitz, a humane man of letters, will I think ultimately tolerate 
if not fully share. 
The language of epistemological argument fills untold volumes, and yet the 
fundamental philosophical dilemmas remain unsolved and are, perhaps, insolvable. 
Despite this impasse, pitched battles in myriad departments continue to be fought 
over the rightness or wrongness of one or another epistemological quagmire as 
though such battles could be abstractly refereed by some neutral, unbiased, 
objective arbitrator, as though "objectivity" still has consensual meaning and is 
exempt from ideologically-driven gaming. As a remedy, sociologists, individu-
ally and collectively, can and ought to ask the fundamental ideological question: 
What do ~really want sociology to accomplish? Huber would make us unreflexive 
automatdns, scientistic statisticians in the service of the state. 8 For myself, I seek 
something considerably more reflexive, democratic, emancipatory, and inclu-
sive. At til,e conclusion of Decomposition, I still want to know what Professor 
Horowitz -*ants sociology to do, practically speaking, and how he thinks it can 
be accomplished given the coercive, hierarchical, politically-charged realities of 
academic life in a hyper-modern society. Whatever our answers, they are 
unavoidably ideological. This does not mean they are wrong or inherently 
destructive. It means only that all of our proposals are ideologically problematic, 
that none can legitimately claim special privileges or exemptions, and that we still 
have to figure out how to go forward in an inclusive, evenhanded, and democratic 
manner. 
There is no royal road to objectivity, no unbiased canon from which objectiv-
ity can be deduced or pulled magically like a rabbit from a hat. We have ridden 
the epistemological horse to death. It is high time to return to the lifeworld of 
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living people, to lay our political cards on the table, to play civilly if possible, but 
to understand clearly that the game is for keeps and that the dice are loaded. 
Notes 
1. Huber's dire account of the dangerous straits into which sociology as a whole has 
presumably drifted is based almost entirely on tendentious, anecdotal data and the fact that 
two (yes, two) sociology departments were terminated during the 1980s. 
2. Huber, a former ASA president (elected in significant part by the votes of feminist 
sociologists she now disparages), appointed the ASA task group on graduate education 
that recommended, among other changes: removing students from departmental commit-
tees, adopting a few narrowly-defined core programs from which students cannot deviate, 
preparing all students for employment in governmental statistical agencies, and expunging 
most undergraduate and graduate courses that fall outside the limited concerns of three pet 
subareas-demography, social organization, and social stratification. 
3. For instructive antidotes to Huber's anti-intellectual and anti-historical mystification, 
see Deegan (1988, 1991) and Reinharz (1992). 
4. The systematic empiricism of so-called mainstream sociological work "claims to be 
value-free and bias-free and uses quantified data, statistical theory, precise problems, 
careful research design, controls, and prescribed data-gathering techniques such as 
questionnaires and interviews" (Reinharz 1984:8). Willer and Willer (1973) demonstrated 
conclusively, and from a positivist perspective, that systematic empiricism of the type 
Huber champions is methodologically absurd and intellectually bankrupt. 
5. No would-be social science student's education is complete without careful study of 
Reinharz's (1984) exploration of experiential sociology. 
6. The gulf between "book culture" and "journal culture" is widening among American 
sociologists, to the detriment ofthose who focus almost exclusively on reading so-called 
mainstream journals. I am struck by Gusfield's (1995:xiv) telling observation that, 
"Becker's Outsiders, I venture to write, has had far more influence on the study of deviance 
than a decade of the American Sociological Review. 
7. For an extraordinarily unabashed example of one such mutual admiration society in 
action, consult the hundreds of self-congratulatory, empire-building references in Kurtz 
(1984). Or, for slightly less parochial examples, consult any of the standard bibliographies 
documenting the self-perpetuating industries spun around the works of Marx, Durkheim, 
Weber, Tocqueville and the like. 
8. For an analysis of how such training manufactures technicians while thwarting the 
development of a "professional self," see Deegan and Hill (1991). Predictably, a pre-
publication reviewer of this article accused the authors of collegial incivility and a total 
absence of objectivity. 
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